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I. Introduction
New investment is the lifeblood of a firm. Typically
new investment arises through either capital expen-
diture or business acquisitions. Much of the research
concerning acquisitions has focused on change of con-
trol transactions such as mergers and takeovers. Cor-
porate capital expenditures have received less atten-
tion. The few studies in the area that examine the
market reaction to capital expenditure announcements
all report a significant positive price response.1 One
view is that capital expenditure announcements pro-
vide information about a firm’s future earnings pros-
pects that is not provided by current earnings. In this
sense, capital expenditure announcements convey a
signal regarding the firm’s available projects. Hence,
a significant positive relation between investment in-
formation and stock returns is expected.
However, investment information should not be
seen in absolute terms; rather, it is context specific.
* We thank Grant Fleming, Richard Heaney, the referee, Al-
bert Madansky (editor), seminar participants at the Australian
National University, and delegates at the 2000 Accounting As-
sociation of Australia and New Zealand Conference for helpful
comments. Contact the corresponding author, Timothy J. Brails-
ford, at t.brailsford@business.uq.edu.au.
1. These studies are McConnell and Muscarella (1985), Wool-
ridge (1988), Chen and Ho (1997), Chung et al. (1998). While
Chung et al. (1998) do not report abnormal returns for the whole
sample, it can be interpolated from their evidence that a small
positive return is observed at the announcement date.
This article examines the
market valuation of an-
nouncements of new cap-
ital expenditure. Prior re-
search suggests that the
firm’s growth opportuni-
ties and cash flow posi-
tion condition the market
response. This study
jointly examines the role
of growth and cash flow,
and the interaction be-
tween them. Using a new
data set of Australian
firms that avoids prob-
lems associated with ex-
pectations models, the re-
sults are remarkably
strong and support a pos-
itive association between
growth opportunities and
the market valuation, in
addition to supporting the
role of free cash flow.
The findings have impli-
cations for the relation-
ship between general in-
vestment information and
stock prices.
This content downloaded from 23.235.32.0 on Thu, 15 Oct 2015 03:11:32 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
224 Journal of Business
For instance, John and Mishra (1990) argue that individual firm factors such
as growth will affect the valuation of capital expenditures. Failure to control
for firm differences can result in seemingly weak market responses (e.g.,
Livnat and Zarowin 1990). A typical response in the literature is to control
for industry membership (Lev and Thiagarajan 1993). However, this approach
has been criticized for its coarse nature (Kerstein and Kim 1995). It is likely
that the market’s perception of new investment will be contextualized within
the firm’s opportunity set. Hence, the interaction of investment and growth
opportunities is important when analyzing the market’s reaction.
The purpose of this study is to examine the market response to capital
expenditure announcements in the context of the agency problems created by
differences in growth and free cash flow environments. A firm operating in
a constrained growth environment is likely to send different signals to the
market compared to a firm operating in a high growth environment. However,
growth opportunities themselves must also be examined in light of the firm’s
available set of free cash flows (Jensen 1986). While prior studies have ex-
amined the impact of growth and to a lesser extent free cash flow on the
valuation response to capital expenditure announcements, they have done so
separately. This article employs a method that allows for the joint consideration
and separate identification of these effects. While growth and free cash flow
have been shown to be relevant factors in conditioning the market response
in other acquisition transactions such as mergers (e.g., Lang, Stulz, and Walk-
ing 1989, 1991), these factors have not been found to be similarly relevant
in the context of capital expenditures.
In this article, capital expenditures are examined using a previously untested
data set from the Australian market that removes much of the noise that has
potentially plagued prior work. The results are quite definitive. They dem-
onstrate that the quality of growth opportunities is singularly the most im-
portant variable in explaining the market reaction to physical asset expenditure
announcements. The significance of this variable is unaffected by other control
variables. Further, the article documents a significant interaction between
growth and cash flow, thereby supporting the role of free cash flow. Specif-
ically, the market reaction is negatively associated with a free cash flow
environment.
The results have several implications. First, they shed new insight on the
interaction between investment, growth, and free cash flow that has impli-
cations for valuation signals and managerial investment decision making.
Specifically, they show the importance of growth and free cash flow when
assessing market valuations. Hence, the findings aid in the understanding of
why the market reacts the way it does. Second, the article demonstrates the
importance of analyzing market reactions to investment announcements in
specific contexts and, hence, has implications for broader research areas. Third,
the research method allows for a finer partitioning based on firm-specific
characteristics which enables a disentangling of effects that in turn provides
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a reconciliation of the extant inconsistent evidence concerning the role of free
cash flow in a mergers context vis-a`-vis a capital investment context.
The article is organized as follows. Section II provides a review of the
literature concerning capital expenditure and develops the hypotheses. The
research method is described in Section III, while Section IV provides a
description of the data and the explanatory variables. Descriptive statistics are
contained in Section V. The results are discussed in Section VI, and Section
VII provides a summary of the study, its implications, and directions for future
research.
II. Hypothesis Development
A. Growth Opportunities
The few studies that have investigated the valuation impact of capital expen-
diture announcements generally report a significant positive market reaction
to the announcements. Some of these studies have extended the analysis to
examine the role of growth opportunities (Szewczyk, Tsetsekos, and Zantout
1996; Chen and Ho 1997; Chung, Wright, and Charoenwong 1998). Using
the well-known q ratio as a proxy for growth opportunities, these studies
report similar results in that positive abnormal returns around the announce-
ment of increases in capital expenditure are associated with firms possessing
high q ratios. The positive market reaction is generally attributed to the newly
acquired growth opportunities. However, market reactions to announcements
of increases in capital expenditure by firms possessing low q ratios are mixed.
While Chung et al. report significant negative market reactions for low q ratio
firms, Szewczyk et al. and Chen and Ho report an insignificant market response
to increases in capital expenditures made by low q ratio firms.2
The above evidence is consistent with the definition of the q ratio as a
proxy to distinguish between firms that have positive net present value (NPV)
investment opportunities under current management from those that do not.
Firms with high q ratios are likely to have positive NPV projects. Hence,
these firms are expected to invest their resources in profitable projects. For
these firms, an increase in new investment is perceived as having a positive
effect on the valuation of the firm’s equity. In contrast, firms with low q ratios
face limited growth prospects, and for these firms additional investment is
not perceived as generating a positive NPV. Hence, growth interacts with the
market valuation of the announcement signal. Specifically, positive valuations
are expected to be greater for firms with higher growth prospects.
2. An alternative approach is undertaken by Kerstein and Kim (1995), who examine the value
relevance of capital expenditure announcements in the context of earnings response coefficients.
They report that unexpected capital expenditure announcements provide value-relevant infor-
mation beyond unexpected current earnings after controlling for various mediating variables,
including growth.
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TABLE 1 The Interaction between Cash Flow
and Growth Opportunities
Cash Flow
Growth Opportunities
Low High
High A B
Low C D
B. Free Cash Flow
Jensen (1986) broadly defines free cash flow as cash flow in excess of what
is required to fund positive NPV investments. Free cash flow is a manifestation
of agency problems because excess cash may not be returned to shareholders.
When firms have free cash, any acquisitions made by these firms are, by
definition, negative net present value investments because these firms face an
investment opportunity set in which there are no favorable growth prospects.
It has been asserted that firms that face unfavorable investment opportunity
sets undertake a diversification strategy (Jensen 1986; Lang and Stulz 1994;
Harford 1999). Furthermore, it has been widely documented that diversifi-
cation is a value-destroying strategy in these circumstances (Lang and Stulz
1994; Berger and Ofek 1995; Servaes 1996).
In the context of capital expenditures, Szewczyk et al. (1996) and Chen
and Ho (1997) undertake a limited examination of the impact of free cash
flow and find some evidence to support the free cash flow argument above.
In other contexts, such as tender offers, the evidence is stronger (Lang et al.
1991; Smith and Kim 1994). Given that firms with free cash flow that un-
dertake new investment are likely to be investing in projects with negative
NPVs, it is suggested that the market will react negatively to announcements
of capital expenditure made by these firms.
The definition of free cash flow, in an empirical sense, varies considerably.
However, consistent with the spirit of Jensen (1986), we define free cash flow
firms as those firms operating with high cash flow in a low growth environ-
ment. As free cash flow is cash flow in excess of requirements, high cash
flow alone is not a sufficient condition for free cash flow to be present, as a
high cash flow firm may have a sufficiently large pool of positive NPV
investment projects. Hence, a low growth environment is also necessary. A
matrix of growth opportunities and cash flow is provided in table 1. Free cash
flow is likely to occur in panel A of table 1. However, the existence of free
cash flow in panel A is not exhaustive. The combinations of cash flow and
growth opportunities in panels B, C, and D do not preclude the possible
existence of free cash flow, as long as these panels satisfy the general condition
that cash flow exceeds the financing required for growth from positive NPV
projects. However, panel A is the most likely combination that would result
in a free cash flow environment. We will return to this table when analyzing
the results.
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C. Capital Market Monitoring
The capital market monitoring hypothesis argues that when managers visit
the capital market for external funds, the capital market has an opportunity
to evaluate managers (Donaldson 1984; Easterbrook 1984). The issuance of
securities forms a relationship between the firm and the capital market such
that it allows the capital market to monitor the firm’s future performance on
a continuous basis.3 Firms that lack internally generated cash, and hence are
dependent on the capital market for funds, are expected to have greater in-
centives to make value-maximizing investment decisions. Otherwise, these
managers will be penalized by the market through higher borrowing costs or
the cessation of the supply of funds.4 Alternatively, firms with high cash flow
can escape capital market monitoring by avoiding visiting the market.5 Hence,
it follows that firms with low cash flow are more likely to make value-
maximizing investment decisions than firms with high cash flow, holding
constant all other factors.
There are few empirical studies specifically concerned with the capital
market monitoring hypothesis. The majority of research on the role of cash
flow has been tested in the context of free cash flow. In part, this is due to
the fact that both the capital market monitoring and free cash flow arguments
are grounded in the same theory. The discriminating feature between the
capital market monitoring and free cash flow arguments is that high cash flow
is a sufficient condition for non-value-maximizing behavior under the weaker
capital market monitoring hypothesis. However, cash flow alone is not a
sufficient condition for non-value-maximizing decisions under the free cash
flow argument. The article also examines whether firms with low cash flow
experience a greater positive market valuation associated with capital expen-
diture announcements than firms with high cash flow.
D. Other Relevant Explanators
As discussed above, capital expenditure announcements should be examined
within the context of firm-specific measures of growth opportunities, free cash
flow, and cash flow. However, it is known from the literature on mergers that
other variables have the potential to affect the market reaction. Hence, to avoid
model misspecification, we also include as control variables the size of the
transaction (Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins 1983), prior management perfor-
mance (Roll 1986; Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1990), the level of managerial
3. The term “future” in this context refers to the time outstanding before the securities mature.
4. There is an implicit assumption here that the monitoring mechanism is efficient. But there
are several other disciplinary mechanisms by which managers are forced to make value-maxi-
mizing decisions (see Jensen [1993] for a discussion that argues that the most effective of these
disciplinary mechanisms is the external capital market).
5. Of course the source of funds itself can convey an information signal. For instance, the
pecking order arguments of Donaldson (1961) and Myers and Majluf (1984) are relevant. How-
ever, a clear identification of the source of finance is required to test the signal (Mikkelson and
Partch 1986). In our sample, there is no disclosure by firms of specific sources of finance associated
with the expenditure announcements.
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shareholdings (Jensen and Meckling 1976; John and Mishra 1990), and lev-
erage (Jensen 1986, 1989; Stulz 1990).
1. Size of capital expenditure. Asquith et al. (1983) argue that insignif-
icant abnormal returns to bidders may be explained by the relative size of
targets to bidders, and they find that bidders’ cumulative abnormal returns
are positively related to target size. This result is consistent with a materiality
argument in that the market reacts only to announcements that have a poten-
tially significant impact on the bidder’s value. Consistent with this view, a
positive relationship is expected between the size of the capital expenditure
(relative to firm size) and any abnormal returns.
2. Prior managerial performance. Morck et al. (1990) argue that man-
agers whose prior performance record is better than others are more likely to
make better investment decisions, simply because good managers make better
decisions than bad managers, on average. Conversely, Roll (1986) suggests
that managers of well-managed firms suffer from hubris and overpay for their
investments. Roll conjectures that firms with good prior performance are more
likely to overpay for an acquisition than poorly managed firms, and as a result
the equity market discounts their share price when an acquisition is announced.
However, the empirical work of Lang et al. (1989) does not support the hubris
hypothesis.
3. Managerial shareholdings. Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and
Meckling (1976) argue that managerial shareholdings are likely to reduce
agency conflicts between management and shareholders due to the implicit
bonding and signaling roles of managerial shareholdings. The convergence-
of-interests hypothesis proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggests that
as the level of managerial shareholdings increase, the costs borne by managers
for not making value-maximizing decisions also increase. Hence, the con-
vergence-of-interests hypothesis predicts that higher managerial shareholdings
should be associated with lower agency costs.
Alternatively, the entrenchment hypothesis suggests that managerial share-
holdings may entrench managers with a high level of ownership and impair
monitoring mechanisms. This leads to greater opportunities for managers to
pursue their own interests at the expense of shareholders (Morck, Shleifer,
and Vishny 1988). This hypothesis predicts greater agency conflicts at high
levels of managerial share ownership, although the empirical results in this
area are somewhat mixed.6
Further, the signaling model of John and Mishra (1990) predicts that the
market response to unexpected changes in investment will be related to the
proportion of insider ownership. Specifically, John and Mishra argue that the
intensity of the market response will be a positive function of insider holdings.
Consequently, the proportion of managerial shareholdings is included as a
control variable.
6. For instance, see Kole (1994) and Cho (1998), who question endogeneity in previous
research of McConnell and Muscarella (1985) and Morck et al. (1988).
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4. Leverage. Jensen (1986, 1989), Hart and Moore (1990), and Stulz
(1990) argue that debt can mitigate against managerial inefficiency. When
leverage is sufficiently large, managers are unlikely to make wealth-destroying
investment decisions because they are under legal obligations to service debt
payments, and negative NPV projects increase the probability of bankruptcy.
In the event of bankruptcy or near bankruptcy, managers’ reputations are
adversely affected, and their job security is threatened. Since long-term con-
tinued employment is generally considered to be a management objective
(Shleifer and Vishny 1989), when the debt level is sufficiently high, managers
are reluctant to make non-value-maximizing investment decisions. Moreover,
debt itself is a control for agency problems. Hence, it is expected that managers
of highly levered firms are more likely to use funds for positive NPV projects
than managers of low levered firms, ceteris paribus.
III. Research Method
This article uses a previously untested data set. The sample includes capital
expenditure announcements made by listed Australian firms. The use of an
Australian data set has several advantages. First, it avoids the general criticism
of data mining whereby further studies are conducted on a set of data originally
used in discovery. This issue has not been previously tested in the Australian
market, and thus, in this respect, the data can be regarded as “clean.” Second,
unlike many other markets, Australian firms rarely announce periodic capital
expenditure plans. Rather, capital expenditure announcements are typically
made during the course of the year as separate releases. Hence, the an-
nouncements are not contaminated by other information.7 Third, as a result
of this practice of not announcing periodic capital expenditure plans, each
announcement can be regarded as containing unexpected news. In comparison
to prior studies where there is a need to form an expectations model, no such
issue arises here. Of course, it is naı¨ve to assume that the market has no
expectations; however, given the unpredictable nature of these announcements,
prediction errors should average zero across a sample. We explicitly address
this issue later, and the evidence supports our assertion. Finally, Schipper and
Thompson’s (1983) prior capitalization argument is not applicable in the case
where firms do not generally announce a separate capital expenditure budget.
The article focuses upon the market valuation of announcements of capital
expenditure. In order to eliminate noise and create a clean experiment, trans-
actions data are used. For each announcement, all trades are collected for 5
trading days either side of the announcement. Returns are constructed from
the transaction data using a time-weighted approach (McInish and Wood
7. Further, we explicitly control for any news contamination in the sample collection and
construction of abnormal returns.
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1992). Abnormal returns are initially calculated using market-adjusted returns.8
Market returns are based on matching the transaction to the nearest 1-minute
index return on the All Ordinaries Index.9 The first step in calculating abnormal
returns is to employ the standard market adjustment as follows:
aAR p R  R , (1)it it mt
where Rit is the observed return of ith stock at t, and Rmt is the market return
at t.
Returns from a control period are then used to remove any effects of
abnormal information flow surrounding the announcement. The control pe-
riods are obtained by taking the same firm and collecting transactions over
an equivalent length window exactly 1 year prior to the announcement date
(to nearest trading day). The control period then represents an equivalent
“news-free” period. In order to ensure a clean control period, if the 1-year
pre-announcement control period contains an announcement of any type, the
period is moved backward by 1 trading day at a time until a clean period is
found.10 The choice of 1 year prior is made to avoid any seasonal effects.
Abnormal returns over the control period are used as a benchmark, as they
represent market-adjusted returns from periods that are not subject to any
announcement news. Market-adjusted returns over the control period are sub-
tracted market-adjusted returns over the announcement period to provide the
abnormal return series used in the analysis, namely,
a cAR p AR  AR , (2)it it i,T1
where is the market-adjusted return at announcement as in (1) andaARit
is the market-adjusted return from the control period 1 year prior tocARiT1
the announcement and is calculated as . The abnormal returnsR  RiT1 mT1
in (2) are then free of any information effects other than the capital expenditure
announcements. Abnormal returns are also constructed using the standard
market model, and these results are discussed as part of the sensitivity analysis
below. An 11-day event period spanning 5 days before and after the an-
nouncement date is used.
8. A firm-specific risk adjustment is not employed, as beta measures at this high frequency
can distort the abnormal returns. For instance, Kim, Lockwood, and McInish (1998) reveal that
beta is unstable through the trading day. Kim et al. question the previous research that treats
betas of individual firms as constant over the trading day (see, e.g., Cohen et al. 1983). Further,
any risk adjustment at this frequency is likely to be inconsequential. Nevertheless, robust results
to risk-adjustment procedures are discussed in a later section of the article.
9. The All Ordinaries Index (AOI) is widely regarded as the market indicator in the Australian
stock market. It comprises around 330 stocks that represent around 90% of the total market
capitalization. The index is value weighted and computed on a minute basis.
10. For instance, assume company X makes an announcement on July 25, 1997, and cumulative
abnormal returns for a [5, 5]–day window cover the period July 18, 1997–August 1, 1997.
The control portfolio consists of abnormal returns on the same firm over the window July 18,
1996–August 1, 1996. If there was an announcement made on July 23, 1996, then the window
is moved back to July 8, 1996–July 22, 1996, assuming there were no announcements made
during that period.
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IV. Data
A. Definitions
The study adopts a narrow definition of capital expenditure, which only in-
cludes expenditure that is strictly physical in nature. Such expenditure includes
expenditures on plant, machinery, property, equipment, and other forms of
physical asset expenditures, including construction of new plant, installation
of new plant, and upgrading of existing plant but excluding assets acquired
through mergers and takeovers. Some construction and acquisitions of a new
plant are undertaken via joint ventures that facilitate the sharing of technology,
management expertise, and resources. Expenditures undertaken via joint ven-
tures are included in the analysis. The appendix provides some examples.
Mergers and takeovers are excluded due to valuation problems associated
with merger and takeover studies.11 A further reason for excluding takeovers
relates to dis-synergies associated with some of the target’s assets, for which
a confounding valuation effect is likely to eventuate. This confounding val-
uation effect can be minimized by focusing on individual transactions rather
than “bundles of assets” found in takeover targets. Moreover, given the in-
herent difference in market reactions reported at takeover announcements in
previous studies, we wish to obtain a “clean” sample of capital expenditure
announcements. Similarly, the definition does not include expenditure asso-
ciated with acquiring businesses and divisions of a business.
Expenditure on upgrades specifically excludes maintenance. Expenditure
on upgrading an existing plant is different from maintenance expenditure in
that expenditure on upgrading is often associated with an increase in pro-
duction capacity and employment, whereas maintenance is an operating item
and expected by the market. The classifications of upgrading, construction,
and installation sometimes overlap because some upgrades involve construc-
tion and installation of new facilities.12
The definition of physical asset expenditure does not include research and
development expenditure (R&D) because most R&D expenditure is not phys-
ical, and where capitalized, R&D that satisfies the accounting requirement
that future benefits are likely to eventuate beyond reasonable doubt is rare.
Further, capitalized R&D is typically announced with other information.13
11. The valuation problems associated with mergers and takeovers are widely documented.
See, e.g., Holland and Hodgkinson (1994) concerning information leakage, Asquith et al. (1983)
concerning multiple bidders, and Holderness and Sheehan (1985) regarding news of substantial
shareholdings.
12. See the appendix for some examples of this type of expenditure.
13. In a random sample of 30 large firms over the period 1995–97, 28 of the 30 firms announce
capitalized R&D concurrently with the year-end announcement relating to current year events
and future prospects. The remaining two firms announced capitalized R&D separately. Hence,
it is difficult to disentangle the market response to capitalized R&D from the other information
contained in the year-end announcement.
This content downloaded from 23.235.32.0 on Thu, 15 Oct 2015 03:11:32 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
232 Journal of Business
B. Sample Selection
The announcement data are provided by the Securities Industry Research
Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA). The initial data set contains 3,133 acquisition
and disposal related announcements14 (classified under subcode 07) made by
816 listed firms between July 1, 1995, and December 31, 1997.15
Several filters were applied. First, related announcements were identified,
and the earliest date of the related announcement was taken as the announce-
ment date. Announcements made before and after the official ASX trading
period between 10:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. were excluded. These steps resulted
in 1,334 and 304 exclusions, respectively. Further exclusions were made for
concurrent announcements. Concurrent announcements included chairperson
addresses, announcements related to option agreements, asset swaps, court
decisions over a particular acquisition, completion of acquisition announce-
ments, divestiture announcements, acquisition of shares, business, merger, and
takeover announcements. This category resulted in a further 914 exclusions.
Announcements of permit, right, distribution, and acquisitions of interest
in projects by mining companies were also excluded since they do not represent
physical asset expenditures. This category resulted in a further 288 elimina-
tions. There were also 65 announcements of contracts being awarded. Because
of the nature of the announcement and the ambiguity of the announcement,
these were also discarded. A final 58 exclusions related to those announce-
ments that did not have information related to the consideration of the trans-
action, accounting information, and intraday share prices, leaving a final sam-
ple size of 170.
C. Accounting Proxies
Accounting information was collected from several sources.16 Growth op-
portunities are measured by the market to book (M/B) ratio.17 The measure-
ment definitions in Fama and French (1993, 1996) are followed. The use of
this proxy is consistent with prior research in the area and elsewhere. However,
14. The announcements are taken from the live “signal G” feed provided by the Australian
Stock Exchange. Signal G is an electronic feed provided to the market and commercial subscribers
and carries time-recorded company announcements. Given the electronic nature of this feed,
accurate collection of the event time can be achieved.
15. Under subcode 07, company announcements are further classified into 18 categories. The
18 subcodes, respectively, are: takeover announcements, shareholder details, periodic reports,
quarterly activities report, quarterly cash flow report, issued capital, asset acquisition and disposal,
notice of meeting, stock exchange announcement, dividend announcement, progress report, com-
pany administration, notice of call, CAP test, chairman’s address, letter to shareholders, ASX
query, and warrants.
16. The primary source was the Connect 4–Annual Reports Service held at the Australian
National University supplemented by the ASX Datadisc and annual reports stored on microfiche
at the National Library of Australia.
17. Tobin’s q is a common proxy used to measure growth opportunities (see, e.g., Lang and
Litzenberger 1989; Lang et al. 1989, 1991). Tobin’s q is typically defined as the ratio of the
firm’s market value to its replacement cost value. The difficulties in the use of Tobin’s q are
noted in Chung and Pruitt (1994).
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the market to book ratio is subject to criticism as it is only one, among several,
proxies that could be adopted. In defence, tests later in the article demonstrate
that the results are unrelated to any market to book effect per se. Moreover,
given the strength and robustness of the results to various research design
methods, there is evidence that this proxy is sound.
Another proxy for growth that has been employed is the difference between
rates of return (on equity) and the required rate of return ( ).ROE RRR
Following the arguments of Lang and Stulz (1994), we favor the market to
book ratio as the measure of growth because it contains an ex ante estimate
of growth prospects and hence captures expectations. In contrast, the calcu-
lation of relies on ex post realizations. In this regard,ROE RRR ROE
captures how the firm has performed. Moreover, the article tests theRRR
sensitivity of the analysis to the use of as a measure of man-ROE RRR
agerial performance with no substantive change in the results. A firm is (ini-
tially) considered to be a high growth firm if its market to book ratio is greater
than the sample median and, conversely, a low growth firm if its market to
book ratio is less than the sample median.18
Cash flow is calculated using the approach of Lang et al. (1991) as follows:19
CFp EBIT DEP TAX DIV INT, (3)
where EBIT is earnings before interest and tax and extraordinary items, DEP
is depreciation expense, TAX is tax paid, DIV is dividend paid on ordinary
and preferred shares, and INT is interest expense on short- and long-term
debt.
Managerial shareholding is defined as the fraction of common shares, not
including options, held by officers and directors of the board. This definition
is consistent with the literature, including Morck et al. (1988), McConnell
and Servaes (1990), and Cho (1998). Managerial shareholding is the sum of
all the common stocks owned by the directors and officers divided by the
number of shares outstanding in that year, expressed as a percentage.
Managerial past performance is proxied by the beta risk-adjusted cumulative
abnormal return calculated over the 3 years prior to the capital expenditure
announcement using monthly price data. The standard market model is em-
ployed. In addition, a different proxy being the difference between return on
equity (ROE) and the required rate of return (RRR) is employed with no
substantive difference in the results.20 The size of the expenditure is measured
18. An alternative categorization is used later in the article where the value of one is used
to segregate firms. The results are robust.
19. This definition is widely used in the literature (see Lehn and Poulsen 1989). Though
alternative measures have been proposed (see, e.g., Bowen, Burgstahler, and Daley 1986; Smith
and Kim 1994), Lang et al. (1991) provide evidence that their results do not alter substantially
when different cash flow measures are used.
20. ROE is estimated as EBIT based on market value of equity from the immediately preceding
financial year, while RRR is calculated from the CAPM where beta is estimated from 1 year of
prior daily data (using Scholes-Williams). The difference between these measures, ROE
, is then used as the measure of managerial performance.RRR
This content downloaded from 23.235.32.0 on Thu, 15 Oct 2015 03:11:32 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
234 Journal of Business
by the dollar value of the transaction normalized by the book value of total
assets of the firm.21
V. Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for the full sample and for subsam-
ples grouped by high and low market to book ratio delineated by the median
value. Variables include the size of firms (represented by total assets, net
assets, and market capitalization), capital structure (represented by leverage
ratio), earnings before tax normalized by total assets, market to book ratio,
cash flow to total assets ratio, and level of managerial shareholding.
Table 2 reveals that the sample consists of a range of firms.22 Panels B and
C present characteristics for the low and high market to book ratio sample,
respectively.23 Panel D presents the difference in means of the variables be-
tween the low and high market to book ratio firms. Apart from the market
to book ratio that is different by construction, the only variables where there
is a significant difference in means are net assets and market capitalization,
which are both larger for the high market to book ratio group.
The size of the capital expenditure transactions in the sample ranges from
$2.55 million to $1.5 billion, as reported in table 3. The mean and median
transaction size is $58.8 million and $33.65 million, respectively. More than
90% of the physical asset expenditure transactions are below $100 million,
with three transactions worth more than $250,000 million. Although there is
no comparative mean and median transaction size for mergers and takeovers,
the size of these transactions would be below those of takeovers and mergers.
Table 4 reports the frequency distribution of announcement by time of the
day, day of the week, month, and year. Panel A shows that announcements
tend to occur during the first hour and the last hour of the trading day.24 It
should be noted that the table is constructed using announcements made only
during the ASX trading hours.25
21. Book value instead of market value is employed to avoid potential problems of multi-
collinearity with other price-based variables. Further, the use of market values instead of book
values is unlikely to have a substantial impact due to the high correlation of 0.95 between the
two series.
22. For instance, the smallest firm is Red River Limited with a total market capitalization of
just over $2 million (as of June 1996), compared to National Australia Bank Limited with total
assets of over $148 billion (as of September 1998).
23. There are two observations with negative market to book ratio, both from Centaur Mining
and Exploration Limited, which made announcements on October 25, 1995, and June 3, 1996.
24. This is consistent with the findings of Wood, McInish, and Ord (1985) and McInish and
Wood (1990), and the Australian evidence of Aitken, Brown, and Walter (1994), all of whom
find evidence that the variance of the intraday returns tends to be greater at the start and end of
the trading day, such that a general U-shaped curve is observed.
25. When a firm’s shares are frequently traded, the time-weighting approach to calculate
returns approximates the “true” return. In order to examine the potential impact of stale prices,
it is necessary to know to what extent the announcements were followed by active trading. While
not detailed here, for 51.8% of the announcements, trading occurred within the first 15-minute
interval. Further, for more than 85% of the announcements, trading occurred within 1 hour
following the announcement.
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TABLE 2 Firm Characteristics by Market to Book Ratio
TA
($m)
TL
($m) TL/TA
NA
($m)
MC
($m) EBT/TA M/B CF/TA MS
Panel A. Full Sample
N 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170
Mean 3,823 2,759 .383 1,063 1,806 .040 1.280 .055 .123
Median 254 52 .375 152 164 .060 1.102 .068 .001
Max 148,123 136,245 3.275 15,746 34,568 .283 4.574 .301 .713
Min .875 .090 .09 31 2.092 .581 3.546 .297 .000
SD 16,846 14,946 .378 2,918 5,967 .103 .861 .094 .203
Panel B. Low Market to Book Ratio (Market to Book Ratio Less Than Median)
N 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85
Mean 2,902 2,365 .344 537 399 .041 .654 .055 .148
Median 226 37 .214 140 126 .062 .810 .068 .001
Max 109,285 99,164 3.275 10,121 5,180 .198 .983 .301 .689
Min 5.144 .090 .009 31 2.765 .422 3.546 .297 .000
SD 16,126 14,755 .503 1,469 873 .094 .755 .094 .217
Panel C. High Market to Book Ratio (Market to Book Ratio Greater Than Median)
N 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85
Mean 4,744 3,153 .422 1,590 3,212 .039 1.833 .051 .099
Median 294 143 .448 151 250 .058 1.675 .071 .001
Max 148,123 136,245 .920 15,746 34,568 .283 4.574 .224 .713
Min .875 .143 .030 .732 2.092 .581 1.103 .338 .000
SD 17,583 15,212 .177 3,796 8,177 .112 .621 .095 .185
Panel D. Mean Difference between Low and High Market to Book Ratio Firms
Difference 1,842 788 .078 1,504 2,813 .002 1.180 .004 .049
t-statistic .71 .34 1.26 1.96* 3.38** .13 10.83** .25 1.54
Note.—A univariate comparison is presented of mean measures of firm characteristics of 170 observations for the period between July 1995 and December 1997. Characteristics are total
assets (TA), total liabilities (TL), leverage ratio (TL/TA), net assets (NA), market capitalization (MC), earnings before tax to total assets ratio (EBT/TA), market to book ratio (M/B), cash
flow to total assets ratio (CF/TA), and percentage level of managerial shareholding (MS).
* Represents a 5% level of significance.
** Represents a 1% level of significance.
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TABLE 3 Summary Statistics of Dollar Size of Capital
Expenditure Announcements of 170
Observations for the Period between July 1995
and December 1997
Size of Expenditure
(AU$’000)
N 170
Mean 58,797
Median 33,650
Min 2,550
Max 1,500,000
SD 134,374
Less than $100 million (%) 85
Greater than $250 million (%) 1
TABLE 4 Frequency Distribution of Capital Expenditure Announcements
of 170 Observations for the Period between July 1995 and
December 1997 by Time of the Day, Day of the Week,
Month, and Year
Number of Announcements Percentage
A. Frequency distribution by time:
10:00–11:00 36 21
11:01–12:00 22 13
12:01–13:00 28 16
13:01–14:00 25 15
14:01–15:00 18 11
15:01–16:00 41 24
B. Frequency distribution by week:
Monday 41 24
Tuesday 25 15
Wednesday 36 21
Thursday 42 25
Friday 26 15
C. Frequency distribution by month:
January 2 1
February 8 5
March 12 7
April 10 6
May 11 6
June 14 8
July 13 8
August 19 11
September 15 9
October 24 14
November 16 9
December 26 15
D. Frequency distribution by year:
1995 30 18
1996 61 36
1997 79 46
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Fig. 1.—Mean cumulative abnormal returns calculated over 15-minute intervals
using transaction data for 170 observations for the period between July 1995 and
December 1997. The window is specified in minutes and covers [1,890, 1,890],
or [5, 5] days. The announcement time is . Abnormal returns are calculatedtp 0
using a control period .a cAR p AR ARit it i,T1
Panel B shows that the announcements occur evenly on Monday, Wednes-
day, and Thursday and slightly less on Tuesday and Friday. Panel C shows
that while a majority of announcements occur during the second half of the
year (namely, 67% occur between July and December and 33% occur between
January and June), the spread across months is indeed even. Recall that the
sample period is July 1995–December 1997; hence, we expect the second
half of the year to be overrepresented by a ratio of 3:2. Finally, panel D shows
that 46% of the announcements occur in 1997, with 36% in 1996, and 18%
in 1995 (again, recall that the sample period is July 1995–December 1997).
VI. Results
A. Announcement Effects
Figure 1 presents the mean cumulative abnormal return for the 170 an-
nouncements over a [1,890, 1,890]–minute window (equivalent to a [5,
5]–day window). Abnormal returns are calculated over 15-minute intervals,
using the method that employs a control period, as discussed earlier.
The cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) in figure 1 show some small
positive market reaction around the announcement period, but there is no clear
evidence that the announcements are associated with significant positive ab-
normal returns. The lack of statistical significance around the announcement
period is confirmed in table 5, which shows that the mean CARs are insig-
nificant across various windows. While not shown here, the abnormal returns
for each 15-minute interval are also insignificant over the window. These
findings are similar to those typically observed for bidders in merger and
takeover studies.
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TABLE 5 Summary of Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns Calculated over 15-
Minute Intervals Using Transaction Data for 170 Observations for the
Period between July 1995 and December 1997
Intraday Windows Daily Windows
Window Length: [120, 120] [60, 60] [0, 360] [5, 5] [2, 2] [1, 1]
Mean CAR (%) .060 .013 .039 .448 .921 .150
t-statistic .47 .52 .11 .67 1.12 .69
Note.—The windows are specified either in minutes or days. The announcement time is . Abnormaltp 0
returns are calculated using a control period .a cAR p AR ARit it i,T1
The lack of significant abnormal returns around the announcement does
not of itself lead to the generalization that the market does not react to capital
expenditure announcements. The insignificant market response may be due
to the comingling of growth and cash flow factors, as argued earlier. This
possibility is explored in the next section.
B. Growth Opportunity Effects
Figure 2 presents the mean cumulative abnormal returns for four subsamples
sorted on the basis of market to book ratio, with the lowest market to book
quartile denoted by Q1 and highest quartile denoted by Q4. For the lowest
market to book ratio quartile, a CAR of 4% is observed over the [1,890,
1,890]–minute window. In contrast, a CAR of 5% is observed for the
highest market to book quartile over the window. That is, there is a large
difference of over 9% between the two extreme quartiles. It is interesting to
note that the CARs for both the middle market to book ratio quartiles are
generally flat across the window. The insignificant CARs for the two middle
groups suggest that the market may not be able to distinguish between marginal
growth firms.
Table 6 confirms the graphical results of figure 2, that is, significant positive
(negative) CARs are observed for the highest (lowest) market to book ratio
quartile. This result is robust over various windows. The difference in CARs
between the highest and lowest market to book ratio quartiles is statistically
significant across all windows.26 However, for the middle quartiles, the mean
CARs and the difference in CARs between the two quartiles are insignificant.
The finding that the market does not respond in any significant manner to the
middle quartiles is a valuable finding in itself since prior research fails to
separate these samples into finer groups.
The results in figure 2 and table 6 are consistent with the signaling model
of John and Mishra (1990). In their model, higher (lower) than expected
investment announcements are good (bad) news for growth firms and bad
(good) news for firms in decline. For mature firms in the middle, there is little
news value. As illustrated above, to the extent that market to book proxies
for growth opportunities, the market reacts favorably for high growth firms
26. Tests for differences between samples are conducted under the assumption of unequal
sample variances.
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Fig. 2.—Mean cumulative abnormal returns calculated over 15-minute intervals
using transaction data for 170 observations for the period between July 1995 and
December 1997 sorted by market to book quartiles. Q1 represents the lowest market
to book quartile, and Q4 represents the highest market to book quartile. The window
is specified in minutes and covers [1,890, 1,890], or [5, 5] days. The an-
nouncement time is . Abnormal returns are calculated using a control periodtp 0
.
a cAR p AR ARit it i,T1
and negatively for low growth firms. Mature firms experience little market
response.
The results above need to be interpreted with care, since it could be argued
that the difference in CARs between the two types of firms (high and low
market to book ratio firms) might have eventuated in the absence of any
capital expenditure announcement. If this assertion is correct, then the dif-
ference in the CARs between the quartiles should be evident over the whole
window, not just around the announcement time. If significant abnormal re-
turns are observed only around the announcement period, it follows that the
abnormal returns are associated with the announcement and not a more general
market to book effect. Hence, by examining the abnormal returns around the
announcement period, one can reasonably conclude whether the difference in
CARs between the two groups of firms is the result of the announcement or
the result of the equity market persistently discriminating between the two
groups of firms.
Table 7 presents abnormal returns for the highest and lowest market to
book quartiles by 15-minute intervals over 1 trading day either side of the
announcement. From this table, significant positive abnormal returns occur
mainly around 2 hours before and 30 minutes after the announcement minute
for the highest market to book quartile, while significant negative abnormal
returns are observed for the lowest market to book quartile at the announce-
ment and in the 2 hours before the announcement. The differences in the price
reaction between the highest and lowest market to book quartiles are significant
in the 2 hours before the announcement, at the announcement itself, and up
to 30 minutes after the announcement. Table 7 therefore provides support for
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TABLE 6 Summary of Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Differences between Mean CARs Calculated over 15-Minute Intervals Using
Transaction Data for 170 Observations for the Period between July 1995 and December 1997 Sorted by Market to Book Quartiles
Panel A
Minute Windows Daily Windows
[120, 120] [60, 60] [0, 360] [5, 5] [2, 2] [1, 1]
Highest market to book quartile:
N 44 44 44 44 44 44
Mean CAR (%) .985 .921 1.089 5.484 4.074 2.594
SD .031 .020 .035 .076 .056 .048
t-statistic 2.10* 3.01** 2.08* 4.80** 4.80** 3.55**
Second highest market to book quartile:
N 42 42 42 42 42 42
Mean CAR (%) .182 .190 .267 .140 .447 .161
SD .020 .012 .023 .063 .048 .030
t-statistic .58 1.03 .76 .14 .61 .35
Second lowest market to book quartile:
N 42 42 42 42 42 42
Mean CAR (%) .097 .138 .222 .376 1.019 .087
SD .028 .023 .029 .086 .061 .042
t-statistic .22 .39 .50 .28 1.08 .13
Lowest market to book quartile:
N 42 42 42 42 42 42
Mean CAR (%) 1.556 1.239 1.470 4.167 2.008 2.184
SD .040 .024 .039 .095 .088 .095
t-statistic 2.54* 3.33** 2.44* 2.89** 1.49 1.49
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Panel B. Test for Difference in Mean CARs
Difference in mean CARs between the
highest and lowest market to book
ratio quartiles:
CARhighest  CARlowest 2.541 2.160 2.559 9.651 6.082 4.778
t-statistic 3.28** 4.52** 3.21** 5.19** 3.80** 2.92**
Mean difference in CARs between the
second highest and second lowest
market to book ratio quartiles:
CARhigh  CARlow .085 .052 .044 .516 .572 .248
t-statistic .03 .13 .08 .31 .48 .31
Note.—Q1 represents the lowest market to book quartile, and Q4 represents the highest market to book quartile. The window is specified in minutes and covers [1,890, 1,890], or
[5, 5] days. The announcement time is . Abnormal returns are calculated using a control period .a ctp 0 AR p AR ARit it i,T1
* Represents a 5% level of significance.
** Represents a 1% level of significance.
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TABLE 7 Mean Abnormal Returns over 15-Minute Intervals Using Transaction Data for 170 Observations for the Period between July 1995 and
December 1997 Grouped into Quartiles Based on Market to Book
Event Time
Highest Market to Book Quartile Lowest Market to Book Quartile
Difference between Highest and
Lowest Market to Book Quartiles
AR
(%) t-Statistic
AR 1 0
(%)
AR
(%) t-Statistic
AR 1 0
(%)
Difference in
Abnormal Returns t-Statistic
t  360 .136 1.14 54.5 .041 .77 40.5** .177 1.35
t  345 .067 .76 54.5 .044 .86 54.8 .023 .23
t  330 .080 1.12 61.4** .025 .44 47.6 .105 1.16
t  315 .037 .81 54.5 .067 .90 52.4 .104 1.19
t  300 .058 1.16 65.9** .097 1.92 59.5** .039 .55
t  285 .192 2.81** 63.6** .056 1.21 59.5** .136 1.65
t  270 .063 1.46 56.8 .039 .40 46.3 .102 .96
t  255 .022 .56 52.3 .001 .01 66.7** .023 .23
t  240 .084 1.95 56.8 .024 .53 57.1* .060 .97
t  225 .005 .12 56.8 .006 .11 47.6 .011 .16
t  210 .052 1.40 63.6** .024 .49 59.5** .028 .46
t  195 .009 .20 47.7 .096 1.82 61.9** .106 1.49
t  180 .049 .74 56.8 .065 1.53 47.6 .015 .19
t  165 .054 1.31 59.1** .001 .06 47.6 .056 1.19
t  150 .017 .29 52.3 .117 2.01* 38.1** .100 1.22
t  135 .105 1.69 36.4** .004 .10 45.2 .109 1.50
t  120 .082 1.96* 56.8 .126 2.47* 38.1** .209 3.15**
t  105 .021 .26 59.1** .012 .26 47.6 .033 .35
t  90 .097 1.96* 56.8 .083 1.71 31.0** .180 2.60**
t  75 .079 2.02* 56.8 .073 1.17 40.5** .152 2.05*
t  60 .093 2.12* 65.9** .181 2.30* 38.1** .274 3.04**
t  45 .121 2.12* 60.5** .066 1.18 42.9* .187 2.33*
t  30 .129 1.90 65.1** .083 1.54 42.9* .212 2.45**
t  15 .126 1.97* 53.5 .213 2.90** 31.0** .339 3.48**
t  0 .183 2.24* 58.1* .171 2.63** 36.6** .354 3.39**
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t  15 .106 1.93 60.5** .227 1.82 47.6 .333 2.44**
t  30 .126 2.14* 65.1** .251 1.84 33.3** .377 2.54**
t  45 .023 .34 48.8 .069 .66 52.4 .046 .37
t  60 .061 .69 51.2 .023 .32 52.4 .039 .34
t  75 .130 .67 51.2 .027 .37 54.8 .103 .50
t  90 .066 .64 48.8 .025 .38 45.2 .041 .33
t  105 .007 .15 41.9* .019 .28 51.2 .026 .32
t  120 .026 .50 50.0 .050 .74 59.5 .075 .89
t  135 .008 .21 56.8 .059 1.18 57.1 .051 .82
t  150 .053 .94 56.8 .004 .08 45.2 .058 .72
t  165 .065 .61 56.8 .021 .53 47.6 .086 .76
t  180 .073 1.73 52.3 .097 1.78 40.5** .170 2.46**
t  195 .002 .03 54.5 .128 1.64 33.3** .130 1.14
t  210 .004 .08 54.5 .087 .54 42.9* .084 .49
t  225 .026 .41 54.5 .007 .10 50.0 .019 .20
t  240 .058 .91 50.0 .086 .88 42.9* .028 .24
t  255 .155 1.77 59.1** .045 1.22 38.1** .201 2.11*
t  270 .038 .80 59.1** .033 .55 45.2 .005 .07
t  285 .029 .77 68.2** .223 .96 48.8 .252 1.07
t  300 .129 1.79 61.4** .021 .39 42.9* .150 1.67
t  315 .066 .84 56.8 .126 1.23 40.5** .192 1.49
t  330 .134 1.52 61.4** .138 1.30 45.2 .272 1.97*
t  345 .047 .57 47.7 .020 .20 45.2 .067 .51
t  360 .039 .60 52.3 .137 1.61 40.5 .176 1.64
Note.—Abnormal returns presented for (Q1) the lowest market to book quartile, (Q4) the highest market to book quartile, and the difference between abnormal returns for Q4–Q1. The
window is specified in minutes and covers [360, 360] or [1, 1] trading day. The announcement time is . Abnormal returns are calculated using a control period atp 0 AR p AR it it
. T-ratios are tests for difference from zero and the column (%) is the percentage of positive abnormal returns in each 15-minute interval, where the test for statistical differencecAR AR 1 0i,T1
is a nonparametric binomial test using 50% of observations as the null hypothesis.
* Represents a 5% level of significance.
** Represents a 1% level of significance.
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Fig. 3.—Mean cumulative abnormal returns calculated over 15-minute intervals
using transaction data for 170 observations for the period between July 1995 and
December 1997 sorted by cash flow to total assets ratio. Q1 represents the lowest cash
flow quartile, and Q4 represents the highest cash flow quartile. The window is specified
in minutes and covers [1,890, 1,890], or [5, 5] days. The announcement time
is . Abnormal returns are calculated using a control period atp 0 AR p AR it it
.
cARi,T1
the hypothesis that the market reaction to capital expenditure announcements
is dependent on the firm’s growth prospects (as measured by market to book
ratio) rather than on the market to book effect per se.
An alternative test of this proposition is to analyze the abnormal returns
over the control period. If the argument holds that the results are due to the
capital expenditure announcement and the interaction with growth prospects,
then there should be no significant returns observed in the news-free control
period. Indeed, this is the case (results not reported here). In the control period,
the differences in abnormal returns between the two portfolios are never
significant in any of the intervals. This result compares to table 7, which
shows that there are significant differences in abnormal returns between the
portfolios clustered around the announcement time.
C. Cash Flow Effects
It was hypothesized above that when firms announce new capital expenditure,
the equity market should react such that firms with low cash flow ratios
experience a significantly higher abnormal return than firms with high cash
flow ratios. Figure 3 presents the CARs grouped by the cash flow to total
assets ratio. No clear pattern exists, which suggests that the role of cash flow
in the capital market assessment of the signal is limited. The results in figure
3 also seem to suggest that the market reacts negatively to the announcements
made by the lowest cash flow group and most positively to the highest cash
flow group. Hence, these results appear prima facie contradictory to the capital
market monitoring hypothesis. However, unlike the market to book quartiles,
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Fig. 4.—Mean cumulative abnormal returns calculated over 15-minute intervals
using transaction data for 170 observations for the period between July 1995 and
December 1997 sorted by the magnitude of the ex post abnormal return at announce-
ment . Q1 represents the lowest AR quartile, and Q4 represents the highest ARtp 0
quartile. The window is specified in minutes and covers [1,890, 1,890], or [5,
5] days. The announcement time is . Abnormal returns are calculated using atp 0
control period .a cAR p AR ARit it i,T1
the 15-minute abnormal returns are generally insignificant for the cash flow
quartiles.
D. Foster, Olsen, and Shevlin’s Method
Brown and Warner (1980) and Foster, Olsen, and Shevlin (1984) specify a
method of examining cumulative abnormal returns based on ex post realized
returns. This method involves grouping the abnormal returns at the an-
nouncement time by their sign. If prices reflect a rational reaction totp 0
the news at announcement time, then positive abnormal returns reflect “good
news” and negative abnormal returns reflect “bad news.” This approach allows
a comparison between abnormal returns on the good (bad) news portfolios
and abnormal returns on the previously formed high (low) growth portfolios
(as in fig. 2). If the CARs based on the Foster et al. ex post method resemble
the CARs of the ex ante market to book ratio groups, then it can be argued
that the market to book ratio is a good proxy for assessing the value of the
growth opportunities of firms.
Figure 4 separates the sample into quartiles sorted by the magnitude of
abnormal returns observed at the announcement time. The bottom (top) quar-
tile contains those firms that experienced the lowest (highest) abnormal returns
at . A mean abnormal return of 0.34% (t-statistic: 5.94) is observedtp 0
for the lowest quartile, while for the highest quartile, a mean abnormal return
of 0.33% (t-statistic: 2.59) is observed. These figures compare to 0.17%
and 0.18% for the lowest and highest quartiles grouped by ranking on the
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market to book ratio (from table 7). Moreover, figure 4 shows a striking
resemblance to figure 2, with a clear differentiation in the two extreme quartiles
and relatively flat lines for the middle two quartiles. The consistency between
these figures here and the abnormal return behavior is indicative of the market
reacting to good and bad news at announcement. In this sense, the announce-
ments convey unexpected news. Recall that in earlier discussion we argued
that capital expenditure announcements in Australia were likely to contain
news because of the lack of periodic capital expenditure reports. These results
are consistent with that argument.
E. Randomization Approach
In this section, we differentiate between the market to book and cash flow
effects. The approach adopted here is similar to the Fama and French (1992)
method in which all observations are first sorted by their market to book ratio
(or cash flow ratio) and then grouped into quartiles. In each quartile, obser-
vations are subsequently re-sorted by their cash flow ratio (market to book
ratio). This method allows for an examination of the cash flow (market to
book) effect after randomizing on the market to book (cash flow).
Table 8 provides the results of the randomization.27 In panels A (B) and C
(D), the value in each cell is the mean (median) CAR. In panels A and B,
the market to book effect is neutralized, while in panels C and D, the cash
flow effect is neutralized.
Panels A and B reveal that when the market to book effect is controlled,
the lowest and highest cash flow quartiles do not exhibit either consistent
positive or negative CARs. If indeed the cash flow effect is dominant, the
difference in CARs between the highest and lowest cash flow firms should
be significant. The results in panels A and B show that this is not the case.
In contrast, in panels C and D, when the cash flow effect is controlled, the
lowest market to book quartile exhibits negative CARs across all cash flow
sorts, and the highest market to book quartile exhibits positive CARs across
all cash flow sorts. Panels C and D reveal a significant difference in both
mean and median CARs between the two extreme quartiles.
In summary, the market to book effect is dominant and remains after con-
trolling for the cash flow effect. In contrast, the cash flow effect is weak in
the presence of the market to book effect.
F. Free Cash Flow Analysis
It was found earlier that the cash flow variable does not explain the market
response to capital expenditure announcements. In this section, the role of
27. Note that the original analysis included two observations with negative market to book
values, namely, CTR 25/10/95 and CTR 3/6/96. The negative market to book values were due
to negative net assets in both years. The exclusion of these two observations does not affect the
results. In fact, the inclusion of the two observations strengthens the results since the CARs
associated with the two outliers are 9.17% and 4.55%, respectively.
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TABLE 8 Cumulative Abnormal Returns Based on Abnormal Returns Calculated
over 15-Minute Intervals Using Transaction Data for 170 Observations
for the Period between July 1995 and December 1997 Grouped into
Quartiles Based on Market to Book
Cash Flow
Market to Book
.105–.871 .872–1.091 1.101–1.675 1.675 – 4.574
Panel A. Cash Flow Effect after Controlling for Market to
Book (Mean CARs)
Lowest (%) 5.11 1.06 2.59 6.65
Low (%) 5.37 1.56 .93 6.65
High (%) 3.49 .78 .22 1.70
Highest (%) 2.93 1.89 .71 5.81
Difference in means (%) 2.18 2.95 1.88 .84
t-statistic 1.10 1.47 .93 .22
Panel B. Cash Flow Effect after Controlling for
Market to Book (Median CARs)
Lowest (%) 5.13 .01 1.71 4.02
Low (%) 4.49 .30 .55 6.10
High (%) 4.19 1.39 .14 1.24
Highest (%) 2.54 2.22 1.67 4.59
Difference in medians (%) 2.59 2.23 3.38 .57
t-statistic .88 1.57 .96 .53
Market to Book
Cash Flow
.338–.034 .036–.068 .068–.094 .096–.301
Panel C. Market to Book Effect after Controlling for
Cash Flow (Mean CARs)
Lowest (%) 4.41 5.80 2.10 3.63
Low (%) .96 .62 .79 .88
High (%) .11 1.95 2.11 3.25
Highest (%) 3.14 4.80 2.52 5.98
Difference in means (%) 7.55 10.60 4.62 9.61
t-statistic 2.60* 2.15* 2.46* 3.45**
Panel D. Market to Book Effect after Controlling for
Cash Flow (Median CARs)
Lowest (%) 4.25 4.49 2.43 3.20
Low (%) .51 .41 1.45 1.31
High (%) .56 2.25 1.72 2.75
Highest (%) 4.02 6.22 3.67 5.80
Difference in medians (%) 8.27 10.71 6.10 9.00
t-statistic 2.23* 2.02* 1.98* 2.29*
Note.—Abnormal returns are calculated using a control period . The value in each cella cAR p AR ARit it i,T1
represents mean CAR over the [5, 5]–day window. In panel A, observations are sorted into quartiles based
on M/B ratio, and within each quartile, observations are sorted into quartiles based on the cash flow to total
assets (CF/TA) ratio. In panel B, the same sort is repeated using median CARs. In panel C, the CARs are
sorted on CF/TA first, and then on M/B ratio. The same process is repeated for panel D. The t-ratio is for the
difference from zero in mean/median CAR between the highest and the lowest groups.
* Represents a 5% level of significance.
** Represents a 1% level of significance.
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TABLE 9 Cumulative Abnormal Returns Based on Abnormal Returns Calculated
over 15-Minute Intervals Using Transaction Data for 170 Observations
for the Period between July 1995 and December 1997
Cash Flow
Growth Opportunities
Low High
A. Median value used as the cut-off for cell groupings:
High (A)
2.002%
(1.72, .074, 40)
(B)
3.865%**
(3.07, .083, 43)
Low (C)
1.828%
(1.14, .107, 45)
(D)
1.722%
(1.63, .066, 42)
B. Value of 1.0 used as the cut-off for cell groupings:
High (A)
2.067%
(1.98, .075, 33)
(B)
3.243%**
(2.92, .076, 50)
Low (C)
2.230%
(1.25, .111, 39)
(D)
1.605%
(1.65, .067, 48)
Note.—Abnormal returns are calculated using a control period . The value in each cella cAR p AR ARit it i,T1
represents mean CAR over the [5, 5]–day window. In panel A, observations are grouped according to the
median market to book and median cash flow to total assets ratios (CF/TA). In panel B, observations are
grouped using the value of 1.0 as the cut-off for the market to book and cash flow to total assets ratios (CF/
TA). Values in parentheses are t-statistic, standard deviation, and number of observations, respectively. Two-
way ANOVA test, .F-statisticp 6.162
** Represents the 1% level of significance.
cash flow is examined more thoroughly by investigating the interaction be-
tween cash flow and market to book effects.
Jensen (1986) argues that when firms lack growth opportunities and have
excess cash flow, managers may undertake negative net present value in-
vestments. Based on this line of reasoning, it is argued that the agency costs
of discretionary cash flow are likely to be substantial when firms face low
growth environments. Hence, the market is expected to react negatively to
new investment announcements under these circumstances. Recall that table
1 presented a matrix of combinations of growth and cash flow. It was argued
earlier that free cash flow firms were most likely to be found in cell A (i.e.,
low growth and high cash flow). Conversely, the market may perceive the
best environment to be one of high growth (i.e., cells B and D). In order to
test the impact of free cash flow, the difference in CAR between free cash
flow firms (cell A) and nonfree cash flow firms is examined in table 9.
Table 9 provides the mean CARs for each of the four cells over the [1,890,
1,890]–minute or [5, 5]–day window. Panel A uses the median values
of the market to book and cash flow to total assets ratios for cell groupings,
while panel B uses the value of 1.0 as the cut-off for cell groupings. The
results from these two approaches are very similar. The table indicates that
free cash flow firms (cell A) suffer significant negative cumulative abnormal
returns of around 2%. Firms with low cash flow and high growth oppor-
tunities (cell D) exhibit an insignificant CAR, while firms with high cash flow
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and high growth prospects (cell B), enjoy the highest CAR of over 3%, which
is significant. Firms with low growth and low cash flow (cell C) exhibit an
insignificant CAR. The differences in CARs between firms in cells A and B,
and A and D are both significant, with values of 5.87% (t-statistic: 3.40)
and 3.72% (t-statistic: 2.40), respectively.28
The results in table 9 indicate that the role of cash flow is twofold. In a
low growth environment, where the agency costs of discretionary cash flow
are likely to be significant, the equity market reacts negatively to these firms
(especially for firms in cell A), consistent with the free cash flow theory.
Conversely, in a high growth environment, cash flow avoids underinvestment
problems (Myers and Majluf 1984). Significant positive CARs are evident for
firms in cell B.29 In summary, the market valuation is negative for firms likely
to suffer from free cash flow and is positive for firms with high growth
prospects.
G. A Multivariate Model
As previously noted, the three main factors that are most likely to influence
the abnormal returns of capital expenditure announcements are growth op-
portunities, capital market monitoring, and free cash flow. Noted earlier as
well, there are also other factors that may influence the abnormal returns at
such announcements. These factors are the size of the transaction, prior man-
agerial performance, the level of managerial shareholding, and leverage.
Prior studies use a two-way free cash flow dummy classification, where a
dummy of one is used for firms with high cash flow and low market to book
ratios (i.e., free cash flow firms) and zero for all other nonfree cash flow firms.
However, as documented earlier, a finer partition may be warranted to capture
both the market to book and cash flow effects. Hence, a finer free cash flow
dummy is employed in following regression:
CAR p a b MBD  b MBD  b CFDi 1 H,i 2 L,i 3 H,i
 b CFD  b (MBD # CFD )4 L,i 5 L H i
 b SIZE  b PASTPERF (4)6 i 7 i
 b MS  b LEV  ,8 i 9 i i
where for the highest market to book ratio quartile and 0 oth-MBD p 1H,i
erwise; for the lowest market to book ratio quartile and 0 oth-MBD p 1L,i
erwise; for the highest cash flow ratio quartile and 0 otherwise;CFD p 1H,I
for the lowest cash flow ratio quartile and 0 otherwise;CFD p 1L,i
is the interactive term, where 1 is free cash flow, and 0(MBD # CFD )L H i
28. These numbers are derived from panel A of table 9. Similar results apply to panel B.
29. The same analysis was also conducted for a narrower [60, 60]–minute window. These
results are essentially the same as those reported here.
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otherwise; SIZEi is size of the capital expenditure; PASTPERFi is prior man-
agerial performance; MSi is managerial shareholdings; and LEVi is the leverage
ratio.
The proxies for each variable were discussed earlier. The regression results
are provided in table 10.30 Ramsey’s (1969) Reset test is used as a regression
specification test.
Model 1 consists of the three key variables only—market to book, cash
flow, and free cash flow. Model 2 consists of all variables. Morck et al. (1988)
and Stulz (1988) argue that the relationship between the level of managerial
shareholdings and firm value may not be linear. Both Morck et al. and
McConnell and Servaes (1990) find a curvilinear relationship between man-
agerial share ownership and firm value. The nonlinearity of this relationship
is incorporated in model 3, by the addition of a quadratic term to the regression
equation. Model 4 excludes the managerial shareholding variable since it can
be argued that while higher managerial shareholdings alleviate agency prob-
lems, this is already reflected in the market to book ratio. Model 5 excludes
the leverage ratio as the impact of debt in forcing managers to make value-
maximizing investment decisions may be already reflected in the cash flow
ratio.31
Consistent with the growth opportunities hypothesis, table 10 shows that
positive CARs are associated with firms possessing high market to book ratios,
and negative CARs are associated with firms possessing low market to book
ratios. The cash flow variables are not significant except in their interaction
with the market to book ratio (i.e., in a free cash flow context). The finer
partition of market to book and cash flow ratios clearly captures a free cash
flow effect, as evidenced by the significant negative coefficient on the inter-
action variable. All control variables are insignificant. The results are robust
across all five models. The model diagnostics indicate a reasonable fit in all
cases.
In summary, these results strongly support the role of growth opportunities
and free cash flow in the market valuation of capital expenditure announce-
ments. This suggests that previous research that fails to support free cash flow
as an important variable may be due to the coarse proxy employed.
H. Sensitivity Analysis
The analysis presented to date uses a definition of abnormal returns that
employs a control news-free period, as in equation (2). Sensitivity analysis
is conducted on all tests above to examine whether the results above are
sensitive to a different abnormal return measure. We repeat the analysis using
the more common abnormal return measure that involves the constrained (0,
30. Several heteroskedasticity tests are provided that are Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey (B-P-G) and
ARCH tests. Both standard t-statistics and White’s heteroskedastic-consistent adjusted t-statistics
are provided.
31. For example, low cash flow firms that visit the capital market are invariably forced by
the capital market to make value-maximizing decisions.
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TABLE 10 Multivariate Regression Results of Equation (4) in the Text
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Constant .001 .006 .007 .003 .009
[.09] [.27] [.33] [.16] [.55]
{.14} {.35} {.43} {.20} {.77}
MBDH .042** .044** .043** .043** .043**
[3.18] [3.30] [3.29] [3.24] [3.23]
{3.72} {3.92} {3.92} {3.80} {3.81}
MBDL .038* .040* .041* .040* .038*
[2.22] [2.14] [2.18] [2.16] [2.16]
{2.09} {2.17} {2.24} {2.10} {2.00}
CFDH .016 .015 .013 .014 .013
[1.01] [.89] [.76] [.86] [.80]
{.97} {.89} {.78} {.88} {.79}
CFDL .006 .003 .002 .004 .002
[.37] [.21] [.14] [.22] [.14]
{.47} {.26} {.16} {.26} {.18}
MBDL # CFDH .040* .043* .042* .042* .041*
[1.98] [2.09] [2.04] [2.03] [2.01]
{2.52} {2.65} {2.60} {2.54} {2.60}
LEV .003 .005 .003
[.41] [.64] [.37]
{.46} {.70} {.43}
MS .000 .000
[1.25] [.71]
{.71} {.99}
MS2 .000
[.71]
{.98}
PASTPERF .000 .000 .000 .000
[1.18] [1.21] [.57] [.55]
{.84} {.86} {.60} {.57}
SIZE .003 .002 .002 .003
[.80] [.57] [.74] [.91]
{1.10} {.85} {1.02} {1.17}
Adjusted R2 .123 .119 .116 .116 .121
Prob value of F-test .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
B-P-G test 3.135 13.424 14.900 3.697 3.505
ARCH test 1.491 2.261 2.135 1.670 1.719
Ramsey Reset test
Reset (2) 2.619 .004 .047 1.114 .937
Reset (3) 1.301 .107 .094 .641 .550
Reset (4) .890 .489 .731 .588 .554
Note.—The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal returns for the [60, 60]–minute window
based on abnormal returns calculated over 15-minute intervals using transaction data for 170 observations for
the period between July 1995 and December 1997. Abnormal returns are calculated using a control period
. t-statistics are in brackets; White adjusted t-statistics are in braces.a cAR p AR ARit it i,T1
* Represents the 5% level of significance.
** Represents the 1% level of significance.
1) market model as specified in equation (1). The results from this alternative
analysis are consistent with those presented above. Growth remains strongly
significant while the cash flow effects are not significant once the market to
book ratio is controlled. Support is again found for the role of free cash flow
in both the two-way contingency test and regression analysis.
As another alternative method to the estimation of abnormal returns, a risk
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adjustment is also employed. This method involves the use of the market
model with parameters estimated using 1 year of daily data prior to the event
window. The beta estimates are obtained from the Scholes-Williams adjust-
ment using one lead and one lag term. The market model parameters are then
applied to the intraday returns over the event window. Again, the results are
remarkably robust. For instance, all coefficient signs and significance of the
regressions reported in table 10 under this method are identical to those re-
ported in the text.
VII. Summary
This article represents a substantial extension of the literature into the market
valuation of announcements of capital expenditure. Such announcements rep-
resent potentially valuable news to investors concerning the future earnings
of a firm. Prior research is limited and has shown that generally new investment
announcements are perceived as favorable news by the market. In this study,
we argue that the value of this news must be conditioned on the firm’s
operating environment. Specifically, the firm’s opportunity set as represented
by its growth opportunities and its cash flow position in relation to those
opportunities affect the market valuation. The hypotheses are tested in a frame-
work that allows for a joint consideration of these factors.
This study utilizes a previously untested data set and employs a method
that eliminates much of the noise potentially present in prior work. The method
involves the construction of abnormal returns that are news free except for
the capital expenditure announcement itself, and market features avoid the
need to prespecify an expectations model. In this sense, the analysis is very
“clean.”
The results show that growth opportunities are singularly the most important
variable in explaining the market reaction to physical asset expenditure an-
nouncements. The significance of the growth opportunities variable is unaf-
fected by other control variables. Moreover, cash flow itself is not a relevant
variable in the context of growth but, rather, has a role interacting with growth
such that free cash flow becomes relevant. This evidence is consistent with
research into announcements of merger activity and helps to explain the current
inconsistency in the capital expenditure literature.
The strength of the results in this context has implications for managers
and other researchers. The conditioned market response supports the role of
agency costs in market valuations. While this is not a unique finding in general,
the finding in this area has consequences for how managers appreciate the
context of their investment decision making. Other studies that examine the
relationship between more general investment information and stock prices,
such as the earnings response literature, can utilize these results to partition
their data and condition their variable association. Further, the finding that
the response is essentially restricted to the extreme quartiles suggests that the
market does not differentiate well at the margin. Moreover, the use of a finer
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variable to capture free cash flow effects suggests that previous research that
fails to segregate the market to book and cash flow ratios into finer partitions
might mask key results.
Finally, this research also provides new insight into the literature concerning
mergers and acquisitions. For instance, Asquith et al. (1983) show that the
relative size of target to bidder is an important variable in explaining the
abnormal returns in mergers and takeovers. However, this research presents
evidence that transaction size is not an important variable. Rather, the over-
riding important variable is the quality of a firm’s growth opportunities.
Appendix
Examples of Announcements Made of Varying Classifications
Upgrades
“AGL was now proceeding with planned upgrade of the Roma to Brisbane natural
gas pipeline system. The upgrade is expected to cost up to $100M by the time the
project is complete. AGL plans to double the capacity of the Roma to Brisbane natural
gas pipeline.”
“CSR has announced that it will upgrade its Hannan South treatment to 600,000
tonnes per annum capacity. Capital costs are $1.8M. The company aims to lift gold
production to 36,000 ounces in 1994/95 and to 42,000 ounces in 1995/96.”
“Contracts have been signed with Thiess Contractors to facilitate the expansion of
the Burton Coal Mine. The capital cost of the upgrade will be less than A$60M and
will employ 130 people on an ongoing basis.”
Joint Ventures
“The cinema joint venture between Village Roadshow, Greater Union and Warner Bros
announced plans to construct a total of seven new multiplexes in Westfield Shopping
towns around Australia for $200M.” [Announcement made by Village Roadshow]
“Amcor announced that it will have an 83% interest in a $16M folding carton JV
with the Chinese Government in Beijing. Amcor will invest $13M and the balance
of the capital will be contributed by the China National Tobacco Corporation.”
“BHP Minerals will proceed with the development of the Hartley Platinum Project
in Zimbabwe in a joint venture with Delta Gold. BHP Minerals will spend $310
million over three years to develop a platinum mine and processing facility.”
Contracts Awarded
“Listed contracting group, Macmahon Holdings Limited, has won a joint bid for the
$63 million contract to upgrade the Royal Australian Air Force’s Learmonth base at
Exmouth on the central coast of Western Australia. The contract, won by a joint
venture between Macmahon Contractors (WA) Pty Ltd and Transfield Construction,
will result in a major operational upgrading of the Learmonth base, 36 kilometres
south of Exmouth.” [Announcement made by Macmahon Holdings Limited]
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“Fleetwood Corporation Limited has been awarded by BHP Iron Ore Pty Ltd a
contract to supply and install a further 25 manufactured homes in Port Hedland for
BHP’S Capacity Expansion 30ect associated with the HBI Development. The contract
value is $3,000,000 with completion due in June 1997.” [Announcement made by
Fleetwood Corporation Limited]
References
Aitken, Michael, Phillip Brown, and Terry Walter. 1994. Intraday patterns in returns, trading
volume, volatility and trading frequency on SEATS. Working paper 94/8, University of Sydney,
Department of Accounting.
Asquith, Paul, Robert Bruner, and David Mullins. 1983. The gains to bidding firms from merger.
Journal of Financial Economics 11 (April): 121–39.
Berger, Philip, and Eli Ofek. 1995. Diversification’s effect on firm value. Journal of Financial
Economics 37 (October): 39–65.
Berle, Adolf, and Gardiner C. Means. 1932. The modern corporation and private property. New
York: Macmillan.
Bowen, Robert, David Burgstahler, and Lane Daley. 1986. Evidence of the relationships between
various earnings measures of cash flow. Accounting Review 61 (October): 713–25.
Brown, Stephen J., and Jerold B. Warner. 1980. Measuring security price performance. Journal
of Financial Economics 8 (September): 205–58.
Chen, S. S., and K. W. Ho. 1997. Market response to product-strategy and capital-expenditure
announcements in Singapore: Investment opportunities and free cash flow. Financial Man-
agement 26 (Autumn): 82–88.
Cho, Myeong-Hyeon. 1998. Ownership structure, investment, and the corporate value: An em-
pirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 47 (January): 103–21.
Chung, Kee, and Stephen Pruitt. 1994. A simple approximation of Tobin’s q. Financial Man-
agement 23 (Autumn): 70–74.
Chung, Kee, Peter Wright, and Charlie Charoenwong. 1998. Investment opportunities and market
reaction to capital expenditure decisions. Journal of Banking and Finance 22 (January): 41–60.
Cohen, Kalman, Gabriel Hawawini, Steven Maier, Robert Schwartz, and David Whitcomb. 1983.
Estimating and adjusting for the intervalling-effect bias in beta. Management Science 29
(January): 235–48.
Donaldson, Gordon. 1961. Corporate debt capacity: A study of corporate debt policy and the
determination of corporate debt capacity. Boston: Harvard Graduate School of Business
Administration.
———. 1984. Managing corporate wealth. New York: Praeger.
Easterbrook, Frank. 1984. Two agency-cost explanations of dividends. American Economic Re-
view 74 (September): 650–59.
Fama, Eugene, and Kenneth French. 1992. The cross-section of expected stock returns. Journal
of Finance 47 (June): 427–65.
———. 1993. Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds. Journal of Financial
Economics 33 (February): 3–56.
———. 1996. Multifactor explanations of asset pricing anomalies. Journal of Finance 51
(March): 55–84.
Foster, George, Chris Olsen, and Terry Shevlin. 1984. Earnings releases, anomalies, and the
behaviour of security returns. Accounting Review 59 (October): 574–603.
Harford, Jarrad. 1999. Corporate cash reserves and acquisitions. Journal of Finance 54 (Decem-
ber): 1969–97.
Hart, Oliver, and J. Moore. 1990. A theory of corporate financial structure based on seniority
of claims. Working paper 560, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA.
Holderness, Clifford G., and Dennis P. Sheehan. 1985. Raiders or saviours? The evidence on
six controversial investors. Journal of Financial Economics 14 (September): 555–79.
Holland, K., and L. Hodgkinson. 1994. The pre-announcement share price behaviour of UK
takeover targets. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 21 (June): 467–90.
Jensen, Michael. 1986. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers. American
Economic Review 76 (May): 323–29.
This content downloaded from 23.235.32.0 on Thu, 15 Oct 2015 03:11:32 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Agency Problems and Capital Expenditure Announcements 255
———. 1989. Eclipse of the public corporation. Harvard Business Review 67, no. 5:61–74.
———. 1993. Presidential address: The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of
internal control systems. Journal of Finance 48 (July): 831–80.
Jensen, Michael, and William Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behaviour, agency
costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3 (October): 305–60.
John, Kose, and Bani Mishra. 1990. Information content of insider trading around corporate
announcements: The case of capital expenditures. Journal of Finance 45 (July): 835–55.
Kerstein, Joseph, and Sungsoo Kim. 1995. The incremental information content of capital ex-
penditures. Accounting Review 70 (July): 513–26.
Kim, Suhkyong, Larry Lockwood, and Tom McInish. 1998. A transaction data analysis of intraday
betas. Financial Review 33 (May): 213–26.
Kole, S. 1994. Managerial ownership and firm performance: Incentives or rewards? Working
paper 93-10, University of Rochester, Graduate School of Business.
Lang, Larry, and Robert Litzenberger. 1989. Dividend announcements: Cash flow signalling
versus free cash flow hypothesis? Journal of Financial Economics 24 (September): 181–91.
Lang, Larry, and Rene Stulz. 1994. Tobin’s q, corporate diversification, and firm performance.
Journal of Political Economy 102 (December): 1248–80.
Lang, Larry, Rene Stulz, and Ralph Walking. 1989. Managerial performance, Tobin’s q, and the
gains from successful tender offers. Journal of Financial Economics 24 (September): 137–54.
———. 1991. A test of the free cash flow hypothesis: The case of bidder returns. Journal of
Financial Economics 29 (October): 315–36.
Lehn, Kenneth, and Annette Poulsen. 1989. Free cash flow and stockholder gains in going private
transactions. Journal of Finance 44 (July): 771–87.
Lev, Baruch, and S. R. Thiagarajan. 1993. Fundamental information analysis. Journal of Ac-
counting Research 31 (Autumn): 190–215.
Livnat, Joshua, and Paul Zarowin. 1990. The incremental information content of cash flow
components. Journal of Accounting and Economics 13 (May): 25–46.
McConnell, John, and Chris Muscarella. 1985. Corporate capital expenditure decisions and the
market value of the firm. Journal of Financial Economics 14 (September): 399–422.
McConnell, John, and Henri Servaes. 1990. Additional evidence on equity ownership and cor-
porate value. Journal of Financial Economics 27 (October): 595–612.
McInish, Tom, and Robert Wood. 1990. A transaction data analysis of the variability of common
stock returns during 1980–1984. Journal of Banking and Finance 14 (February): 99–112.
———. 1992. An analysis of intraday patterns in bid/ask for NYSE stocks. Journal of Finance
47 (June): 753–64.
Mikkelson, Wayne, and Megan Partch. 1986. Valuation effects of security offerings and the
issuance process. Journal of Financial Economics 15 (January/March): 31–60.
Morck, Randall, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny. 1988. Management ownership and market
valuation: An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 20 (January/March):
293–315.
———. 1990. Do managerial objectives drive bad acquisitions? Journal of Finance 45 (March):
31–48.
Myers, Stewart, and Nicholas Majluf. 1984. Corporate financing and investment decisions: When
firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics 13 (June):
187–221.
Ramsey, J. B. 1969. Tests for specification errors in classical linear least squares regression
analysis. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, ser. B, 31:350–71.
Roll, Richard. 1986. The hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers. Journal of Business 59 (April):
197–216.
Schipper, Katherine, and Rex Thompson. 1983. Evidence on the capitalized value of merger
activity for acquiring firms. Journal of Financial Economics 11 (April): 85–119.
———. 1996. The value of diversification during the conglomerate merger wave. Journal of
Finance 51 (September): 1201–25.
Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert Vishny. 1989. Management entrenchment: The case of manager-
specific investments. Journal of Financial Economics 25 (November): 123–39.
Smith, Richard, and Joo-Huyn Kim. 1994. The combined effects of free cash flow and financial
slack on bidder and target stock returns. Journal of Business 67 (April): 281–310.
Stulz, Rene. 1988. Managerial control of voting rights: Financing policies and the market for
corporate control. Journal of Financial Economics 20 (January/March): 25–54.
This content downloaded from 23.235.32.0 on Thu, 15 Oct 2015 03:11:32 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
256 Journal of Business
———. 1990. Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies. Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics 26 (July): 3–27.
Szewczyk, Samuel, George Tsetsekos, and Zaher Zantout. 1996. The valuation of corporate R&D
expenditures: Evidence from investment opportunities and free cash flow. Financial Manage-
ment 25 (Spring): 105–10.
Wood, Robert, Tom McInish, and J. Ord. 1985. An investigation of transactions data for NYSE
stocks. Journal of Finance 40 (July): 723–39.
Woolridge, J. R. 1988. Competitive decline and corporate restructuring: Is a myopic stock market
to blame? Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 1 (Spring): 26–36.
This content downloaded from 23.235.32.0 on Thu, 15 Oct 2015 03:11:32 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
